2. By their contacts with top-level officials of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent release by the President and the Attorney General of the highest level security material to a government that stands in direct opposition to the United States, these individuals cannot be permitted to occupy their official positions.
3. By treating with the enemy on the Cuban issue and actively blocking legitimate military actions against a Soviet Cuban armed entity in close proximity to the United States, these individuals have endangered the people of the United States, and permitted enemies of this country to actively place atomic weapons within the reach of many American cities.
4. Removal by impeachment or other legal means is considered unfeasible and too protracted.
5. Therefore, an alternative solution has been found to affect this removal.
6. This removal is the result of a consensus between the various concerned official agencies.
7. This operation, code named ZIPPER, was under the direction of James Angleton of the Agency, assisted by Robert Crowley and William Harvey, also of the agency.
8. The government departments directly concerned consisted of:
a. The Central Intelligence Agency
b. The Federal Bureau of Investigations
c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
9. Other government agencies involved but not with specific knowledge were:
a. The US Department of the Treasury, Secret Service Division
b. The National Security Agency
c. The National Security Group
d. INTERARMCO
e. The US Department of State, Passport Division
10. Following the removal of the President (JFK), the new President (LBJ), who had been fully briefed prior to the act agreed "in the interest of national concerns" to appoint a special commission chaired by the Chief Justice, for the purpose of "setting public concerns to rest." (continued)
10. Mr. Angleton was in complete control of all evidence presented to this committee and worked closely in conjunction with Mr. Sullivan of the FBI to ensure that nothing was brought before the committee that it did not want to acknowledge.
11. As both the Vice-President and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations had been slated for replacement by the Kennedy faction, their support for the project was practically guaranteed from the outset.
12. The Vice-President came to believe that an attempt would be made on his life at the same time and was greatly concerned for his own safety.
13. As the Vice-President (LBJ) and the Director of the FBI were longtime neighbours and very friendly, the Director has repeatedly assured the President (LBJ) that he was not a target and that no shots were fired at him in Dallas.
14. The President (LBJ) has been reassured but is still considered very leery of any possible such actions being taken against himself or members of his personal family.
15. One of the primary goals of ZIPPER, the removal of the Attorney General, has been discussed repeatedly with the President by DCI, and the President has agreed to gradually force him out of his position. He has stated, however, that the popularity of the AG is such that his removal must be performed with care.
16. Representative Ford (R) of Michigan, a member of the Commission is working directly with Director Hoover and reports all incoming information directly to him.
17. Full cooperation with friendly media sources has ensured that public attention has been drawn to Oswald as the sole killer. The President (LBJ) feels strongly that any attempt to portray Oswald as a tool of the Soviets is liable to create "too high a level of international tension," which the President feels might lead to direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.
18. The President (JFK) is not receptive to plans of the JCS, supported by the entire agency, to eradicate Castro and his Marxist government from Cuba. The President states that war almost occurred as a result of the last military attempt to dislodge the Cuban dictator, and he does not wish to replay that aspect of the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine.
19. The President has indicated, however, that an escalation of U.S. Military involvement in French Indochina is not unreasonable. Reports given to him by the agency, as well as the JCS, have been well received.
20. The President's aide, (Walter) Jenkins, has also supported this idea and the Secretary of Defense has come down strongly in favor of it.
21. The President believes that his occupancy of the White House is due to the death of his predecessor and has a desperate desire to achieve a degree of legitimacy.
22. He has been advised that a war-time president is always assured of re-election (i.e. Wilson, Roosevelt) but only in the event that the war is prosecuted with vigor and has attendant military successes.
23. On a related topic, the French President de Gaulle, while in Washington for the late President's funeral, held several conferences with the new President as well as other officials to include the agency.
24. The General stated several times and with some asperity that he had been the object of a number of assassination attempts in the past, some going back to the war, and that he had grown tired of them. He stated that the OAS attempts to shoot him or bomb him had been known to members of the agency who and, in at least one case, assisted the IAS assassins.
25. The General also stated that he was aware through a French Intelligence report that the assassins of the President were French citizens.
26. Because it is viewed as vital that the French become involved in NATO and to assuage the concerns of the General, guarantees were given by both the President and the DCI that no further actions would be undertaken that could result in an assassination and further, that the United States would support French commercial interests in French Indochina in return for French cooperation with NATO.
27. The French President agreed to this but made several oblique threats to the President about his reactions in the event of future agency "meddling" in French domestic and foreign policy.
28. The General was reassured repeatedly on these points and is now apparently in agreement with the United States' aims in Southeast Asia. He made several remarks about the trade in opium in that area being extremely lucrative and stated that he had his own problems with narcotics traffic in the Mediterranean area.
29. It is now believed, and electronic surveillance of the President's lines of communication while in the United States does not support the possibility that he might have active knowledge of any American involvement, or projected involvement, in this area.
30. Both the agency and the President feel that the French President has fired a "shot across our bows," but that these issues have now become resolved. The President feels however that the French will have to be watched carefully in the future and that if American interests become established in French Indochina, we had best consider our own interests at that time.
31. In the matter of the Soviet Union, it is evident that they were initially concerned that the removal of Kennedy might be laid at their doorstep. As this was certainly one of the objectives of the agency as well as the JCS, it has been necessary to repeatedly reassure their leadership that there would [be] no further attempts to execute any military or overt clandestine operations against either Cuba, or its leader, Castro.
32. In the matter of the public perception of the Dallas action, extensive use has been made of Agency connections with major American media organs i.e. New York Times and the Washington Post. The Times is strongly supporting the Commission and its findings and we are assured that they will continue to do so. The same attitude has been clearly and strongly expressed by the Post.
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